The dilemma explored in Plato's dialogue Euthyphro. Are pious things pious because the gods love them, or do the gods love them because they are pious? The dilemma poses the question of whether value can be conceived as the upshot of the choice of any mind, even a divine one. On the first option the choice of the gods creates goodness and value. Even if this is intelligible it seems to make it impossible to praise the gods, for it is then vacuously true that they choose the good. On the second option we have to understand a source of value lying behind or beyond the will even of the gods, and by which they can be evaluated. The elegant solution of Aquinas is that the standard is formed by God's nature, and is therefore distinct from his will, but not distinct from him.
The dilemma arises whatever the source of authority is supposed to be. Do we care about the good because it is good, or do we just call good those things that we care about? It also generalizes to affect our understanding of the authority of other things: mathematics, or necessary truth, for example. Are truths necessary because we deem them to be so, or do we deem them to be so because they are necessary?
The most common argument against divine command theory is the Euthyphro dilemma. The argument gets its name from Plato’s Euthyphro dialogue, which contains the inspiration for it. The Euthyphro dilemma is introduced with the question Does God command the good because it is good, or is it good because it is commanded by God? Each of the two possibilities identified in this question are widely agreed to present intractable problems for divine command theory.
Euthyphro's dilemma is the question, "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?"
The problem here is in reconciling the idea of "good" with the idea of "God."
If things are good because God loves them, then that doesn't really give us a clear idea of what the criteria are for goodness; it is just an arbitrary set of things you better memorize if you want to be good.
If God loves things because they are good, that suggests that there is some force over and above God that determines what is good. This doesn't really sit well with most people's idea of God. Moreover, it results in a logical absurdity, because the definition of God is "the most supreme being," meaning that there can BE no force over and above God. This idea about goodness destroys the concept of God, and so it becomes untenable in this context.
"Is what is morally good commanded by God because it is morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by God?"
Does good depend on God's existence?
What did the Socratics think of as God but the optimal goodness in intellect, and for any good to exist there must be the potential of its being, being God.
It is false dilemma, just a question of dependency.
Comments
The dilemma explored in Plato's dialogue Euthyphro. Are pious things pious because the gods love them, or do the gods love them because they are pious? The dilemma poses the question of whether value can be conceived as the upshot of the choice of any mind, even a divine one. On the first option the choice of the gods creates goodness and value. Even if this is intelligible it seems to make it impossible to praise the gods, for it is then vacuously true that they choose the good. On the second option we have to understand a source of value lying behind or beyond the will even of the gods, and by which they can be evaluated. The elegant solution of Aquinas is that the standard is formed by God's nature, and is therefore distinct from his will, but not distinct from him.
The dilemma arises whatever the source of authority is supposed to be. Do we care about the good because it is good, or do we just call good those things that we care about? It also generalizes to affect our understanding of the authority of other things: mathematics, or necessary truth, for example. Are truths necessary because we deem them to be so, or do we deem them to be so because they are necessary?
http://www.answers.com/topic/euthyphro-dilemma
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The most common argument against divine command theory is the Euthyphro dilemma. The argument gets its name from Plato’s Euthyphro dialogue, which contains the inspiration for it. The Euthyphro dilemma is introduced with the question Does God command the good because it is good, or is it good because it is commanded by God? Each of the two possibilities identified in this question are widely agreed to present intractable problems for divine command theory.
http://www.moralphilosophy.info/euthyphrodilemma.h...
Euthyphro Dilemma Summary
What Is Euthyphro Dilemma
Euthyphro's dilemma is the question, "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?"
The problem here is in reconciling the idea of "good" with the idea of "God."
If things are good because God loves them, then that doesn't really give us a clear idea of what the criteria are for goodness; it is just an arbitrary set of things you better memorize if you want to be good.
If God loves things because they are good, that suggests that there is some force over and above God that determines what is good. This doesn't really sit well with most people's idea of God. Moreover, it results in a logical absurdity, because the definition of God is "the most supreme being," meaning that there can BE no force over and above God. This idea about goodness destroys the concept of God, and so it becomes untenable in this context.
"Is what is morally good commanded by God because it is morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by God?"
Does good depend on God's existence?
What did the Socratics think of as God but the optimal goodness in intellect, and for any good to exist there must be the potential of its being, being God.
It is false dilemma, just a question of dependency.